Self Assessment

Lazarus Group Recent Trends

Published On : 2022-05-25
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Lazarus Group Recent Trends

Lazarus Group Recent Trends

Recently Observed Campaigns

The following list contains recent campaigns observed by CYFIRMA Threat Intelligence (CTI) that are attributed to the Lazarus Group and or its affiliates in 2022.

  • • UNC038
  • • UNC050
  • • UNC048
  • • UNC047
  • • guarantee price
  • • UNC042
  • • UNC039
  • • UNC035
  • • UNC030
  • • UNC029
  • • UNC028

Recently Observed Activities Details

High-level summary of recent campaigns observed by CYFIRMA attributed to the Lazarus Group in 2022.

  • • UNC038 (Jan 30, 2022 – May 10, 2022)
  • • UNC050 (Apr 11, 2022 – Apr 27, 2022)
  • • UNC048 (Apr 11, 2022 – Apr 27, 2022)
  • • UNC047 (Mar 3, 2022 – Apr 18, 2022)
  • • guarantee price (Feb 1, 2022 – Apr 12, 2022)
  • • MUD NATIONALS (Jul 1, 2018 – Mar 20, 2022)
  • • UNC042 (Jan 15, 2022 – Mar 17, 2022)
  • • UNC039 (Jan 31, 2022 – Mar 9, 2022)
  • • UNC035 (Jan 27, 2022 – Feb 22, 2022)
  • • UNC030 (Dec 24, 2021 – Jan 25, 2022)
  • • UNC029 (Apr 28, 2020 – Jan 17, 2022)
  • • UNC028 (Mar 24, 2020 – Jan 13, 2022)


Out of the 13 campaigns observed by CTI in 2022, the majority of campaigns were targeted at multiple counties across the globe, however, a couple of the campaigns observed by CTI appeared to target specific nations.
The below figure illustrates all the counties which were targeted in these campaigns.

Most Targeted Countries
The following figure illustrates the countries which were subject to the Lazarus Group campaigns.

The United States and Japan have the most favorable targets for Lazarus Group and were targeted in 9 and 8 campaigns respectively. Countries like Singapore, India, and United Kingdom – while not at the top – remain to be of particular interest to the Lazarus Group and were also featured in multiple of their campaigns.
Lazarus Group is known to carry out attacks for financial gains and it can be assessed that the threat actor group similar to financially motivated cyber criminals may opt to attack multiple disparate targets for high returns. However, as the above figure illustrates some of the targeted countries, we observed in 2022 campaigns were part of only one campaign and more interestingly, some of the campaigns were only targeted at specific nation-states. For example, Japan was the only target for the campaigns MUD NATIONALS, UNC029, and UNC028.

Most Targeted Technology
The Lazarus Group leveraged vulnerabilities and exploits in Application Server Software, Database Management Software, Operating systems, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Solutions, and Web Application to infiltrate the network and systems of potential victims.
The below figure illustrates the technologies that target the threat actor group during these campaigns. From the trends, it can be seen that exploiting weaknesses in web application- related software and products is the most favored method by the Lazarus Group. In addition, attempts to exploit remote access solutions such as VPNs have been observed which have been the focal point of cyber criminals these days.

Most Targeted Industry
From the campaign observed by CTI in 2022, Lazarus Group attacked organizations from more than 20+ industry verticals. The majority of these attacks were focused on Industrial Conglomerate organizations, working in the financials, IT sector, and automobile sectors.

Malware/ Tools observed
Below is the list of all the malware used by the Lazarus Group during these campaigns. Only a few of the malware were leveraged by the threat actor in multiple campaigns and most of the malware was seen in only one campaign.

  • • AppleJeus
  • • BlueNoroff
  • • CliptoShuffler
  • • Cobalt Strike
  • • Donoff
  • • Emotet
  • • FallChill
  • • Go Implant
  • • Keydoor
  • • MoonBounce
  • • Mydoom
  • • NukeSped RAT
  • • Pebbledash
  • • Phorpiex
  • • PseudoManuscrypt
  • • Rifdoor
  • • ScrambleCross
  • • StealthMutant
  • • StealthVector
  • • Tiger Downloader
  • • TigerRAT
  • • Tofsee
  • • Torisma
  • • Valyria
  • • Vidar

Top Malware
While numerous malware were used by the Lazarus Group in these campaigns, the NukeSped RAT was the most observed malware in multiple campaigns followed by Cobalt Strike. Other malware including AppleJeus, Emotet, FallChill, and Pebbledash were also leveraged in more than one campaign.

Type of Attacks
The majority of the observed campaign carried out by the Lazarus Group involved heavy use of exploiting vulnerabilities in internet exposed systems including weakness in email/ VPN appliances. The use of malware implants and lateral movement into the organization was a common tactic. The method of phishing and credential theft was only observed once out of 13 campaigns tracked by CTI.

Threat Actor Profile
Alias: APT 38, APT-38, APT38, Andariel, AppleJeus, Appleworm, Bluenoroff,B ureau 121, Covellite, Dark Seoul, Group 77, Group77, Guardians of Peace, Hastati Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima, Lazarus, NICKEL ACADEMY, NewRomanic Cyber Army Team, Operation DarkSeoul, Operation GhostSecret, Operation Troy, Silent Chollima, Stardust Chollima, Unit 121, Whois Hacking Team, ZINC

Researchers describe the Lazarus Group to have 3 subgroups as listed below. While the Lazarus Group tend to concentrate on espionage-style attacks, other subgroups such as Bluenoroff are specialists in cyberattacks that largely have a financial element.

  • Subgroup: Andariel, Silent Chollima
  • Subgroup: BeagleBoyz
  • Subgroup: Bluenoroff, APT 38, Stardust Chollima

Origin: North Korea
Active: 2007 – Present

Description: Since at least 2009, Lazarus Group has been observed as a highly sophisticated cybercriminal group that is known to be affiliated with the North Korean government (as per the Council of Foreign Relations – CFR). They are known to the U.S. government as Hidden Cobra. The person involved in the Lazarus Group operations is known as a member of an organization affiliated with Lab 110, a component of DPRK military intelligence.

They are capable of rapidly developing, mutating, and evolving existing exploits/malware in their malware development unit. Recently, they are observed targeting cryptocurrency exchange companies.

Lazarus Group’s targets have primarily been South Korea (organizations of political relevance), Bangladesh Bank, Sony Pictures Entertainment, and some other Unites States- based organizations. Lazarus Group is believed to be divided into at least two subdivisions: the first, named Andariel, which focuses primarily on attacking the South Korean government and organizations, and the second, Bluenoroff, whose main focus is monetization and global espionage campaigns. Some of the long-standing campaigns attributed to them are Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, Ten Days of Rain, the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack, the SWIFT-related bank heists, and WannaCry.

Targeted Countries: Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Darussalam, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hongkong, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Myanmar, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russia, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, Bangladesh.

Targeted Industries: Aerospace & Defense, Capital Markets, Consumer Finance, Cryptocurrency, Defense, Diversified Financial Services, Energy, Entertainment, Government, Hotels, Investment Trusts (REITs), Media, NGO, Real Estate, Restaurants & Leisure, Technology, Telecommunications., Thrifts and Mortgage, Banks

Tools: The group has been known to utilize following tools in their attacks chain: NestEgg, Tdrop2, SHARPKNOT, RawDisk, Destover, CleanToad, ELECTRICFISH, Quickcafe, Http Dr0pper, NachoCheese, DeltaCharlie, PowerBrace, BTC Changer, HotelAlfa, Castov, Volgmer, DoublePulsar, Plink, BlindToad, PowerRatankba, PowerShell RAT, RomeoNovember, ValeforBeta, PEBBLEDASH, Koredos, RomeoEcho, RomeoWhiskey, ARTFULPIE, RomeoGolf, Yort, NukeSped, RomeoFoxtrot, Vyveva, Troy, Bookcode, Bitsran, CheeseTray, RedShawl, SierraCharlie, TFlower, Hawup, SheepRAT, FallChill RAT, Stunnel, RomeoCharlie, RomeoDelta, Rifdoor, Jokra, Romeos, SierraAlfa, SLICKSHOES, Aryan, ClientTraficForwarder, HOPLIGHT, WolfRAT, Tdrop, Andaratm, BanSwift, Recon, 3Rat Client, Duuzer, BUFFETLINE, EternalBlue, netsh, Mydoom, Concealment Troy, Dacls RAT, KillDisk, BADCALL, MATA, OpBlockBuster, CookieTime, Dtrack, Hermes, ATMDtrack, Mimikatz, COPPERHEDGE, DyePack, RomeoMike, Hotwax, RomeoBravo, Gh0st RAT, PowerTask, RomeoAlfa, Wormhole, Brambul, Fimlis, AuditCred, BISTROMATH, Joanap, HTTP Troy, KEYMARBLE, Rising Sun, Bankshot, PhanDoor, 3proxy, ProcDump, RatankbaPOS, VHD, HOTCROISSANT, PSLogger, RomeoHotel, PowerSpritz, HtDnDownLoader, WbBot, VSingle, BLINDINGCAN, TAINTEDSCRIBE, BootWreck, Contopee, Dozer

Malware: The group has been known to utilize following malware in their attacks chain:
AuditCred, Volgmer, WannaCry, BADCALL, APPLEJEUS, HARDRAIN, MATA, ThreatNeedle, Destover, Bankshot, RATANKBA, Proxysvc, Vyveva, Torisma Spyware, FALLCHILL, HOPLIGHT, DarkComet, KEYMARBLE, TYPEFRAME

Motive: CTI believes that Lazarus Group and associate groups’ activities are aligned to the political interests of North Korea and attacks are primarily motivated by financial or/and political gains.

Recent Activity:
The threat actor has been observed exploiting the Log4i remote code execution vulnerability to inject backdoors that fetch information-stealing payloads on VMware Horizon servers. Lazarus Group uses NukeSped to install an additional console-based information-stealer malware, which collects information stored on web browsers. In some attacks, Lazarus Group was observed deploying Jin Miner instead of NukeSped by leveraging Log4Shell.


Sr No. Tactic Technique
1 TA0042: Resource Development T1583.001: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
T1583.006: Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
T1587.001: Develop Capabilities: Malware
T1588.004: Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates
2 TA0001: Initial Access T1189: Drive-by Compromise
T1566.001: Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
3 TA0002: Execution T1059.003: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204.002: User Execution: Malicious File
T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation
4 TA0003: Persistence T1098: Account Manipulation
T1547.001: Boot or Logon AutoStart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009: Boot or Logon AutoStart Execution: Shortcut Modification
T1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
T1542.003: Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
5 TA0004: Privilege Escalation T1134.002: Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token
T1547.001: Boot or Logon AutoStart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009: Boot or Logon AutoStart Execution: Shortcut Modification
T1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
T1055.001: Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
6 TA0005: Defence Evasion T1134.002: Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token
T1564.001: Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
T1562.001: Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
T1562.004: Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1070.004: Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
T1070.006: Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp
T1036.005: Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information
T1542.003: Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
T1055.001: Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1218.001: Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File
7 TA0006; Credential Access T1110.003: Brute Force: Password Spraying
T1056.001: Input Capture: Keylogging
8 TA0007: Discovery T1010: Application Window Discovery
T1083: File and Directory Discovery
T1057: Process Discovery
T1012: Query Registry
T1082: System Information Discovery
T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
T1124: System Time Discovery
T1033: System Owner/User Discovery
9 TA0008: Lateral Movement T1021.001: Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002: Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
10 TA0009: Collection T1560: Archive Collected Data
T1560.002: Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library
T1560.003: Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method
T1005: Data from Local System
T1074.001: Data Staged: Local Data Staging
T1056.001: Input Capture: Keylogging
11 TA0011: Command and Control T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
T1132.001: Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
T1001.003: Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation
T1573.001: Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
T1008: Fallback Channels
T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer
T1571: Non-Standard Port
T1090.002: Proxy: External Proxy
12 TA0010: Exfiltration T1048.003: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol
T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
13 TA0040: Impact T1485: Data Destruction
T1491.001: Defacement: Internal Defacement
T1561.001: Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe
T1561.002: Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
T1496: Resource Hijacking
T1489: Service Stop
T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot


The Lazarus Group has been known to be spearheaded by the North Korean government in alignment with their political and economic goals to target organizations and exfiltrate sensitive information to assist their local companies. It is widely established that the group’s primary motive is financial gains to overcome the effect of long-standing sanctions. The group is known to leverage new strategies and custom toolkits with their campaigns, as a result, the cyber operations may appear irrational. However, it is suspected the North Korean threat actors tend to operate on a wider scope as opposed to other nation-state threat actors and are likely to continue their operations similarly.

CTI suspects North-Korean threat actor groups will likely continue collaboration with Chinese and/ or Russian threat actor groups to meet their objectives. Doing so, they may offer their services/expertise as part of the Hacker-as-a-Service (HaaS) model to steal sensitive information in return for financial gains. Not only such cooperation will have a common target but will also provide some form of relief from the sanctions that have been enforced by the government of other nation states on these countries.

Recommended Actions

  • Deploy a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks, and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes
  • Deploy Zero Trust Policy that leverages tools like security information management, advanced security analytics platforms, security user behaviour analytics, and other analytics systems to help the organization’s security personnel observe in real-time what is happening within their networks so they can orient defences more intelligently.
  • Facilitate security teams with attack surface management capability for continuous discovery, inventory, classification, prioritization, and security monitoring to gain comprehensive visibility of the enterprise environment.
  • Emphasize the responsible use of social media platforms, train the workforce on the amount and nature of information being shared.
  • Plan periodic Red Team exercises to measure the effectiveness of the people, processes, and security technologies used to defend the environment. Red Team exercise helps organizations to improve security controls detection, enhance defensive capabilities, and measure the overall effectiveness of existing security operations.
  • Perform regular Cyber Benchmarking exercises to benchmark the security performance against industry peers, measure the impact of risk mitigation efforts, and report security progress and results to the Board of Directors more clearly and effectively.
  • Enable emerging security solutions like deception technology powered with machine learning helps in real-time breach detection and prevention.
  • Classify and segregate the organization’s business-critical system a.k.a as Crown jewels and have a special security monitoring on those assets.
  • Ensure applications requiring authentication over the internet are protected with multi- factor authentication.
  • Ensure combination security control such as CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), Device fingerprinting, IP backlisting, Rate-limiting, and Account lockout are implemented and adequately strengthened to thwart automated brute-force attacks.
  • Improve the detection signatures of Intrusion detection and prevention systems with custom rules to monitor and alert network intrusions.
  • Exert caution when opening email attachments or clicking on embedded links received via email communications.
  • Update all applications/software regularly with the latest versions and security patches alike.
  • Deploy an email filter solution that screens based on headers and malicious content (e.g., malicious macros, infected attachments, etc.), categorizes email, inspects Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) against reputation feeds, and has customizable rule-based filters.
  • Strip and/or block emails containing active content (e.g., ActiveX, Java, Visual Basic for Applications [VBA])or macros by default. Administrators should allowlist such content only for legitimate reasons.
  • Ensure detection signatures and blocklists are up to date.
  • Implement warning banners to alert users about emails with links and attachments that originate from outside the organization.


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